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THE BURST OF THE BUBBLE AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING
IN JAPAN
Starting in 1990 Japan entered a new era'. in its postwar economic development, known
as the- burst of the bubble. Corporations have been pressured to make fundamental restructuri11g
to find ways to relieve their cost burdens. In contrast with the American experience, however,
Japanese firms have laid off and terminated far fewer workers during this economic recession.
This paper raises the following questions: Why do Amt;!rican and Japanese firms respond
di~ferentiy to economic recession? How do Japanese firms retain workers, when formal
accounting rules would dictate cutting labor costs through worker termination? We offer an
institutional explanation based on a conception ;of Japanese firms as embedded in a different
economic and political institutional context which supports their approach to restructuring. More
specifically, we elaborate certain "organizing principles" that inher~ in Japanese organizations
as indicated by their response to prolonged recession. We then discuss the institutional
mechanisms that allow Japanese firms to resist terminating regular employees as a response to
recession.

INTRODUCTION
The recognition that capitalism comes in different varieties is a comerstorie of the Clinton
Administration's foreign policy. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the monolithic images of
capitalism versus communism prevailing during the cold war years gave way to the recognition
of the many varieties of economic systems camped under the big tent of "capitalism." The
variations within capitalist systems are many, but one key indicator of variation is how systems
respond to pressures arising from economic change.

Sy steins' response patterns reflect

priorities, commitments to different groups, and institutional configurations that underpin the
relationships among business organizations, the government, and labor.
The industrialized nations have been bogged down in a prolonged world-wide recession
.

'

during this past decade. Businesses have introduced structural changes often discussed under
the general rubric of "corporate restructuring" to find ways to relieve their cost burdens. The
general idea of corporate restructuring is to adjust the amount, allocation, and costs of facilities,
capital, and labor to existing demands for products and services to· derive improved output. 1
One significant trend in the recent corporate restructuring in the U;S. is worker dismissals-and
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"Corporate restructuring" is an ambiguously defined. term. It is also an abstract term
· because the criteria by which organizations adjust differ by type of capitalist system.
Additionally, in most cases, its definition is tautological. Whatever a ·corporation does under
pressure is considered restructuring. A perusal of the business and organization literatures
·suggests various elements of ·corporate restructuring. S_ome of these include: increased
investment in production technology (Shaman, 1993); elimination of product lines (Taylor,
1993); combining internal units, new stock offerings, early retirements, selling non-essential
units (Treece, 1992); closing plants by eliminating employees (Anonymous, 1992); the
"externalization.of employment" by taking regular employees out and relying more on contract
or temporary workers (Pfeffer and Baron, 1988; Pfeffer, 1994); change top executives and board ·
members (Taylor, 1992); reallocate employees, change decision making location (centralize or
decentralize) (Wrubel, 1992; Zetlin, 1993); eliminate positions through attrition, buyouts,
retirement incentives, and involuntary layoffs, change incentive structures and job descriptions ·
·(Brewer, 1993).
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increasing reliance on a contract, temporary work force (Pfeffer and Baron, 1988; Pfeffer,
1994). Recent layoffs of tens of thous~ds of workers at high profile firms like General Motors,
IBM, and Kodak serve to illustrate the severity and magnitude of this pressure to restructure .
. Estimates from 1993 alone run between 500,000 and 600,000 worker terminations (Abelson,
1993).

According to one business-research firm in ·cambndge, Massachusetts, from 1983 to

1993, Fortune.500 companies eliminated 4. 7 million workers, or one-quarter of their work force
(Genasci, 1994).

In contrast with the American experience, Japanese firms have laid off and terminated
far fewer workers during this economic recession. This is significant, given the depth and
duration of the recession. This is not to say Japanese frrms do not layoff workers. · However,
the outright dismissal of workers, especially regular employees, has been more difficult and
more limited.
Why do American and Japanese firms respond so differently to economic recession?
How do Japanese firms retain workers, when formal accounting rules would dictate cutting labor
costs through layoffs? We offer an institutional explanation based on a-conception of Japanese
firms as embedded in overlapping and cross-cutting networks of business and social relations.

we· contend that Japanese corporations are embedded in a different economic and political
institutional context which supports their approach to restructuring;
This paper has two goals. First, we identify and elaborate certain "organizing principles"
inherent in Japanese organizations as indicated by their response to prolonged recession.
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Second, we discuss the institutional mechanisms that allow Japanese firms to resist terminating
workers (especially regular employees) as a response to recession. 2

The Bursi of the Bubble-and-Corporate Restructuring

Starting in 1991, Japan entered a new era in its postwar industrial evolution, known as
the "burst of the bubble" following the sharp increases in asset prices in the late 1980s (Table
1). During the boom years of the bubble economy, corporations generated capital quickly, based
on the use of overpriced land, investing heavily in new production facilities and real estate
purchases in and outside of Japan. When the Bank of Japan finally tightened money supplies
in 1989, interest rates soared, asset prices plummeted, and the stock market plunged by 60
percent, causing the bubble's burst. The impact of the recession is most severe in the· computer,
banking, insurance and securities, and automobile industries.
'

Intertwined with the bubble burst has been the continuing appreciation of the yen against
the American dollar. In February 1985, the exchange rate stood at 263 yen to one dollar. Since

2

By regular employees we mean full-time workers who are known as seisha-in in Japan.
These workers, as opposed to temporary full-time workers or part-time workers, possess
distinguished statuses. There is no formal job contract guaranteeingjob security, but firms have
almost always assured their job security. "Life-time employment" mainly characterizes life-long
careers of regular employees among large firms and those in the public sector, or about 20-25
percent of the labor.force. The origin of life-time employment can be traced to personnel and
management practices of- late Tokugawa period of the 19th century. It was adopted in the
manufacturing sectors in the 1920s and 1930s and was extended to include both white and blue
collar workers among large firms after WWII.
_
Among small and medium size firms, which employ nearly 50 percent of the labor force,
the ·concept of life-time employment is difficult to apply. ·small companies go out of busines_s
frequently and jobs are less secure, causing unemployment. However;. the outright dismissal of
regular employees is still rare for these firms. In addition, many employee exits from small and
medium firms occur for voluntary reasons, such as, starting their own company. Becoming
one's own boss remains an attractive career goal. for workers in small and m_edium -scale
companies (Ballon, 1989: 11).

4

the Plaza Accord of 1985, however, the yen has appreciated more than 150 percent, making
Japanese produ_cts more expensive to American consumers. In 1992 it was argued that Japanese
business would not survive if the value of yen decreases below 120-125 yen to the dollar
(Seasick, 1993). Nineteen ninety-four has witnessed bi-monthly prognostications of the massive
failure of corporate Japan, if the yen falls below 120, then 115, then 110, . . . The current
exchange rate dropped well below that level, 100 yen to the dollar, diminishing the abilities ·of
Japanese corporations to overcome recession by relying on more exports.
Table 2 summarizes survey data on corporate response to the recession. .. These data
come from national surveys periodically conducted by the Ministry of Labor. They compare
the current recession with two previous recessions (oil shock recession of 1974-75 and the
recession of 1986 caused by the rising yen). The information was obtained during a meeting
with mini~try officials in Japan in June 1993 and· directly from the Ministry of Labor in 1994.
Comparing current restructuring efforts with the previous major economic ·recessions
suggests an institutional logic operating as a set of selection rules governing how Japanese firms
respond to economic recession. The overall average in Table 2 (last 3 columns) s_uggests ·that
more than one in tlu;ee companies are using some form of employment adjustment in 1994, as.
compared with one in four companies in 1986 and one in two in the oil shock of 1975. Thus,
the impact of the current recession on employment appears more severe than 1986 but less than ·
1975.

In .addition, the distribution of employment adjustment strat~gies across the three

recessions suggests Japanese companies have engaged in a sequence of gradual and incrementally
.

.

severe employment adjustments fot all three recessions. The survey further indicates that the
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strategies are designed to find the least-labor disruptive cost-cutting steps sufficient to meet costcutting requirements. In general, these strategies include the following steps:

a. reduction of oyer-time work;
b. no hiring of new workers;
c. reassignment of worker positions;
d. dismissal of part-time and temporary workers;
e. allocation of extended vacations;
. f. temporary factory closing;
g. voluntary retirement and dismissal of workers;
Interviews with company executives, conducted by the authors of this paper during summer of
1993, elaborated features of these adjustment measures. The hierarchical sequence of steps is
not necessarily linear and discrete; but a general incremental pattern. Companies employ more
than one adjustment measure at a time and do not necessarily move from one measure to the
next in.a mechanicalway. We contend thaJ, in the aggregate, Japanese firms tend to move
cumulatively and incrementally from one strategy to the next as need dictates.

a. Overtime Reduction
Overtime reduction is usually the first strategy of employment adjustment amo!!g Japanese
firms. The survey data show this is by far the most common strategy of employment adjustment
for the current and two previous recessions. 3 At present, one in four companies are using this

3

For 1975 recession, "no hiring" and "overtime reduction" \Yere the two most popular
overall strategies. However, overtime reduction was the most common method among three
industijes across the three recessions.

6
measure.

A survey of businessmen in the Tokyo area in 1993 _also found that one in five

workers are experiencing overtime reduction ("Japanese have more family time," 1993).
While overtime reduction by itself is not a unique measure to Japan (Abraham and
Houseman, 1989), it is a powerful strategy of cost-cutting in a country where 30 hours of
overtime a month is -not unusual among regular workers.

According to one labor group,

overtime reduction amounts to more than three trillion yen a year _(27 billion US dollar in 1993)
("A special news report," 1993). For individual workers, overtime has been incorporated as
part of a "normal" work schedule. Also, many workers have com~ to rely on the extra income
it generates. We estimate that the overtime of 30 hours a month would amount to at least a 20 ·
4
Thus, overtime reduction is often met with
percent increase
in worker's monthly income.
.
.

mixed reactions from workers::.-more time to spend with the family but a tighter budget with
which to_ enjoy the extra time.
In addition to overtime reduction, the reduction or elimination ofbonus payments has also
been used by companies. Annual bonuses typically amount to three to six months of worker,' s
monthly income (paid in two installments, summer and winter). Thus, bonus payments provide
an additional source of flexibility for a corporation in cutting labor costs. Though this particular
measure is not incorporated in the periodical national survey in Table 2, interviews with
company executives as well as recent company announcements detail the popularity of such

In 1989 Japanese employees worked an average of 175 hours per month, or 2,159 hours
per year. This compares with_ l,957 hours for Americans and 1,646 hours for French, and
1,638 for Germans (Ministry of Labor, 1991, 1993). Thus, 30 hol,lrs of overtime represents 20
percent of the average monthly working hours.
4
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measures. As a rule, bonuses for managerial positions are cut first before cutting bonuses for
the rank and file.
b. Reassignment and Dispatching of Regular Workers

Worker reassignment (hai-ten) and dispatching (shukko) appears to be the second most
prevalent employment adjustment strategy during the current and previous recessions. Nearly
one in five companies reported to have used this measure in early 1994.
Worker reassignment occurs when employees are reassigned to different sections or
divisions within a firm.

Re-assignment itself does not necessarily lead to pay reduction.

Assignment to an entirely
new job is not unus~al. Japanese companies
are known for their
.
.
.

.

.

generalist-oriented job-training by which workers are expected to move from one type of job to
another throughout their careers.

Job rotation programs have been widely used to enhance

productivity and career development among blue-collar workers whose jobs are more clearly ·
defined. However, at present, some companies are re-assigning white collar workers to bluecollar jobs, which is a radical departure from the past conventions.
Mazda,
for example; shifted
.
500 white collar workers to assembly line jobs, previously performed by temporary· workers
(Pollack, 1993g).
Worker dispatching (shukko) is the movement of regular workers from one company to
its subsidiaries or affiliates. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of dispatching: one is geared
toward job training and career development, and the other is part of the official retirement and ·
-

-

post-retirement career of a worker. In the latter case, workers who are past 50 years of age
become prime· ca_ndidates for dispatching. ·nispatched workers are kept at dispatched.companies
. until reaching mandatory retirement age set by each firm (usually 60). When the dispatched
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workers retire, they may be offered a second career job that entails less responsibility.and pay.
Or, dispatching may involve reduced-salary-in exchange for the postponement of retirement to
age 65.
In addition to the merit of keeping the company lean; dispatching; can lead to substantial
cost savings. Typically, workers are dispatched from larger to smaller firms. Since smaller_
firms pay a lower salary than do larger firms, larger firms pay for the differences (20-30 percent
of worker's original salary). Nippon Steel, for example, reduced 22 percent of its work force
(or 14,652 positions) through dispatching from 1985 to 1993;

Nearly_ 70 percent of this

dispatching took place to Nippon Steel's 200 -subsidiaries and affiliates (11 Shin-rtihon seitetsu, 11
1994).

It has been suggested that dispatching provides an important liaison between the company_
and -its subsidiaries or affiliates by maintaining a high technical standar:d and a networ~ of
communications that enhance corporate performance.

As the current recession continues,

however, it has become more and more difficult for large firms to find room for dispatching
among their subsidiaries and affiliates. This constraint was met with a new business, approved
by the Ministry of Labor ("Hltode-busoku, 11 1994). In December 1993 several large_ ~rms and
banks jointly created a company that specializes in job placements of dispatched workers.

c. No Worker Hiring
Employment adjustment through no hiring is another prevalent strategy among companies
during these three recessions (Table 2). At present, more than one in seven companies are
resorting to such a measure. No hiring of workers appears to be a straight-forward cost cutting
measure. The use of this particular measure is more prevalent today than in 1986, when only
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7 percent of the companies surveyed were not hiring workers. However, the current level is still
lower than in 1975, when as high as 37 percent of companies did not hire any workers.
Nevertheless, the job market continues to deteriorate for the new graduates during the
current recession. There were only 89 job openings for each 100 job seekers in February 1993,
the lowest level since 1987 ("Japan's jobless rate climbs," 1993). By March 1994, it continued
to slide to 65 openings for each 100 job seekers (Ministry of Labor, 1994).5 The job market
is even tighter for female college graduates.

There were 1.81 jobs for every male college

graduate, but only 0.79 for each female college graduate in March of 1994 ("Kyuju-yonen no
daisotsu," 1994).
Unlike hiring practices in the U.S., Japanese firms hire new employees only once a year.
Recent graduates of high schools and colleges all start in a company on the same day, forming
the freshman cohort and climbing the career ladder together. Each cohort is a basic building
block of the Japanese seniority system. No hiring of new workers, therefore, eliminates a slice
of the cohort pyramid and can disrupt the promotion clock for the internal labor market of an
organization. Also, this strategy is not taken lightly because of its effect on the company's
reputation as an employer.

5

Table 2 includes statistics for no hiring of any employees. The hiring of "new employees"
is a special subcategory including only recent graduates. Large firms hire "new employees"
only once a year, during the fall. National surveys, conducted by the Ministry of Labor, assess
employment conditions periodically (every 3 months or so) and thus, the question of new hire,
specifically, is not included in the regular survey.

10

d. Dismissal of Part-time and Temporary Workers

The temporary and part-time workers constitute nearly 20 percent of the non-agricultural
labor force in Japan. 6 Most temporary, part-time workers are women. 7 The temporary work
force acts as a safety valve, swelling during peak periods and shrinking in slack times.
Dismissal of part-time and temporary workers has been the fourth most prevalent employment
adjustment strategy during all three recessions. Over one in ten companies reported having
terminations of temporary work in the 1975 survey. During the present recession, 6 percent of
companies are resorting to this measure (Table 2).
Although not as prevalent as in 1975, the dismissal of part-time and temporary workers
can still be substantial because many part-time and temporary workers put in long hours of
work. According to a national survey of 3,000 part-time workers conducted in 1990, part-time
workers, on average, worked 5.9 hours a day for five days with the average daily commuting

time of 20 minutes (Special Committee to the Minister of Labor, 1991). Married women, who
constitute 80 percent of part-time work force, brought income equal to 20-25 percent of the

6

The size of part-time work force is not any larger in Japan than in the U.S. According
to Fortune (1/24/94), 25 percent of the labor force in the U.S. involve temporary, part-time
workers. Pfeffer (1994) reports that temporary workers constitute one-quarter of the nonagricultural labor force in the. State of California. In California, the demand for labor in nonagricultural sector increased by 54 percent between 1970 and 1990. During the same period,
the number of workers involuntarily employed part-time increased by more than 120 percent.
In Japan, various national surveys indicate that many temporary workers, especially women,
select this form of work rather than working as full-time, regular workers (Usui, 1993).
7

According to the Ministry of Labor (1992:247), in 1987, 8 percent of males in nonagricultural labor force and a staggering 49 percent of females were part-time, temporary, or
some type of contract workers.
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family income. Thus, the loss of part-time jobs can lead to considerable decline in family
income, similar to the impact of overtime reduction on worker's income.
e. Allocation of Holidays/Extended Vacations

In some instances the allocation of extra holidays and extended vacations are used to cut
costs.

As indicated in Table 2, over four percent of companies surveyed carried out such

measures during the current recession. Starting in the fall of 1993, Nippon Steel Corp., for

two extra paid-holidays per month by closing its companies.
I

example, instituted

While taking

I

holidays, workers rbceived about 80 to 90 percent of their pay (Pollack, 1993g).
The creatiod of extra holidays and vacation time can be a welcome gift in a country
I

I

where two-day weefend holidays are not fully instituted. As of 1992, only 14.5 percent of all
I

companies (with thirty workers or more) had two-day weekend holidays. Another 33 percent
of enterprises surveyed had bi-weekly two-day weekend holidays (Ministry of Labor, 1992: 28687; Ministry of Labor, 1993: 382). Whether the taste of extra rest and leisure would foster new
values for leisure, or whether workers return to be "working dogs" when the recession is over,
remains to be seen.

f. Temporary Factory/Business Closing
Temporary factory closing was a substantial employment adjustment strategy for
manufacturing firms in the 1975 recession. During the current recession, the use of this measure
is considerably limited, as only one in twenty firms adopted it. This measure is sometimes taken
with the assignment of extended vacations and holidays.
It must be pointed out that temporary factory closing may lead to permanent closure.

Permanent factory closing is a severe form of corporate restructuring. Japan has closed many
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factories and removed excess capacities in industries which lost international competitiveness
(e.g., textiles, ship building, and aluminum) (Pollack, 1993d). When a company closes a
factory, regular workers are usually offered the options of job transfer or voluntary retirement
with extra benefits. While this principle of business closure may not be strictly followed by
smaller-scale companies, large companies have made efforts to honor lifetime employment
principles and· to minimize the social and economic impact of factory closure to a geographical
area. A famous example involves the Nippon Steel's shut-down of its oldest furnace town,
Kamaishi, built in 1857 and closed gradually in the mid-1980s. The company tried to transfer
workers to other plants, as well as to create jobs to employ the former steel workers. Recently,
Nissan Motors announced the closure of its oldest assembly factory in Zama, offering job
transfers for 2,500 regular workers (Pollack, 1993d).
g. Voluntary Retirement and Dismissal of Regular Workers
According to the survey, voluntary retirement and dismissal of regular workers is the
least prevalent of all the employment adjustment strategies (Table 2). Also, interviews with
corporate managers suggest that active encouragement of voluntary retirement is used but is
almost always kept as a last resort. They also indicated that the dismissal of regular employees
is difficult because it violates the fundamental sense of trust, bonding workers and the company.
They further contend that it damages the reputation of the company.
Some forms of "voluntary" retirement are essentially forced resignations, or a stricter
version of kata takaki (meaning, tap on the shoulder) which is a customary procedure used to
facilitate voluntary departures of workers. Anecdotes have circulated that some companies go
to great lengths to force people out (Pollack, 1993b). The case of Pioneer, a top manufacturer
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of audio equipment, illustrates the point. In December 1993, the company approached its 35
managers to "consider" voluntary retirement (with increased retirement benefits). However,
these voluntary retirement packages were essentially forced resignations. Pioneer's approach
was met with harsh media criticisms. The issue is not that occasional layoffs and worker
dismissals do not occur; only that their scope, infrequency and the public response to dismissals
underscores the prevalence and constraint on this strategy. Later, we consider the effect of
drastic restructuring strategies, especially worker dismissals, on social reputation of companies.
In sum, during the three major recessions, Japanese firms have engaged in an organizing
logic that is pro-employment--particularly of regular workers. This organizing logic is indicated
by a set of selection rules that minimize the disruption to. the worker-company relationship.
Employment adjustment needs are spread broadly across different measures and within company
.

-

networks (as in the case of dispatching). We contend that these selection rules cannot be taken
out of context. These are not universal selection rules of employment adjustment that might be
applied anywhere. These selection rules are maintained and supported by institutional features
of Japanese society. In the remainder of the paper, we discuss some of those institutions within
which the firm is embedded and how they support and circumscribe the firm's ability to resist
laying off employees during economic downturns.

Institutional Response

By some measures, the most efficient solution to recession driven overcapacity is to cut
labor costs. So, how can Japanese firms retain employees, when formal accounting rules would
dictate cutting labor costs? We argue that the institutional environment in which Japanese
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companies operate provides important clues to the pattern of Japanese responses that differ from
those in the U.S. We propose the following points on the "economics of the firm." These
points provide a broad outline of the institutional network allowing Japanese firms to retain
employees until the most dire of circumstance. First, the economic activities of Japanese firms
are socially embedded in networks of institutions and do not operate as atomized actors pursuing
their own particular interests. Second, economic activity is social action and cannot be separated
from the quest for social approval, affiliation, political influence, and reputation of the firm
(Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992). Although, these principles are_ universally applicable, they
are more pronounced in a country like Japan.

Governance Structure of the Japanese Firm
Labor relations scholars point to the "sacred" labor institutions--life time employment,
seniority, and enterprise uniorts--as one important explanation of pro-employment corporate
responses.

Nevertheless, the importance, or. the· sacredness, of these institutions should not

simply be taken-for-granted. These labor practices continue partly because they are supported
by the governance structure of Japanese firms. A governance structure that is quite different
from that of the typical American firm (Aoki, 1987; Dore, 1993; Gerlach, 1992; Useem, 1993).
The differences involve several parameters: the dominant constituency of the firm; the source
and level of firm ownership; and the level of independence of the firm's management. The
different configurations of these dimensions of internal organization result in different
organizational policies designed to adjust to economic recession.
Comparing American and Japanese modes of corporate governance, various authors have
identified "capital" as opposed to "labor" centered models of governance. American firms are
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"capital-centered models of corporate ownership" (Gerlach; 1992: 222) operating in "stockmarket-centered capitalism" (Dore, 1993). The firm exists primarily for the benefit of stock-holders of publicly traded firms among all the firm's constituencies (i.e. workers, suppliers,
creditors, customers, regulators, etc.). Useem (1993:7-8) contends this priority means that
corporate structure and policy is "defined_ and evaluated according to the criteria of shareholder
value". (high dividends and stock price appreciation). The top priority of management is to

maximize capital returns. S
The experience of the 1980s exaggerated the governance structure of American firms:
a prolonged period of profit decline in the 1970s; the emergence of corporate "raiders" ~d the
ascent of large aggressive institutional investors (pension funds, investment companies, insurance
companies and bank trusts) increased the control of stockholders over the priorities of American
firms (Useem, -1993). First, low profits after President Reagan's deregulation of the early 1980s
forced close scrutiny of entrenched management, internal structure, and business strategy. Poor
performance came to be blamed on American management . that was . unresponsive to
shareholders' concerns (i.e., dividends and appreciation). Second, the"leveraged buyouts" of
the 1980s (taking publicly traded firms, private) where companies' shares were purchased on
collateral of the acquired company were the most complete form of ownership control (cf.
Useem 1993:24). R.J.R. Nabisco in 1988 dramatized the mechanics of this form of control at ·

8

Even though American firms would emphasize 'growth' as the .principal goal, a survey
of 500 major American and Japanese companies found that executives of American firms placed
return on investment as their principal corporate objective. Share price increase and market
share was ranked second and third. In contrast, executives of Japanese firms placed market
share first, and return on investment second and the refreshment of the product portfolio third.
Share price increase came last in Japan (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985: 176).
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the highwater point of the strategy's popularity. Third,- large pension fund shareholders emerged .
in the 1980s actively taking control of corporate boards of directors, structures, and policy to
reflect their interests. Shareholders expect to receive a significant share of profits in the form
of dividends and share price appreciation. 9 Dividends are taken as a sign of "successful
operation and competent management" (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985: 183).

Stock price

appreciation provides pension fund managers with validation oftheir stock portfolios. The recent
example of the C~ifornia Retirement System changing the General Motors board of directors
had rippling effects on other major American firms.
The 1980s saw attention focused on shareholders' interests, with frequent and radical
"redeployment" and "rightsizings" of an additional 500,000 to 600,000 in 1993 alone. The
capital-centered model dictates that in times of economic recession, primary effort is devoted
to protecting. shareholder value.

This means dividends must be protected and -_stock prices

maintained continuously. Worker payroll, capital investment, R&D ate cut before dividends
are
.
.

cut. From the viewpoint of neo-dassical · economists, "management unilaterally chooses its
employment and investment policy in order to maximize share price posterior to individual or
collective wage bargaining" (Aoki, 1987: 266).
Japanese firms, by contrast, are characterized by a "strategic" or "labor" centered model
of corporate ownership (Gerlach, 1992: 223) where dividends, profits, and rates of capital return
are relatively low. Legally speaking, firms are the property of shareholders, but in practice, ·
.

-

firms exist more for the benefit of the employees than shareholders~ Shareholders stand as

9

According- to Abegglen and Stalk (1985: 183), most American companies support a
dividend payout rate of 50 percent of earnings.
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investors rather than controllers of a firm (Abegglen and Stalk, 1985). In time of a recession,
Japanese firms cut dividends before cutting payroll.

In fact, cutting the dividends are

customarily done without the consent of the shareholders in Japan (Japan Update, 1992: 4). 10
The major feature of the Japanese model, according to Aoki (1987: 266), is its emphasis on "the
mediation postulate; according to which management, possibly in cooperation with the enterprise
union, coordinates wage _determination and managerial policy making simultaneously in order
to achieve an efficient outcome. "
This governance structure, in conjunction with other institutional supports, allows
Japanese firms to adjust to recession and overcapacity in ways that may seem peculiar to
Americans. The Japanese firm's ability to resist worker termination is indicated by the swelling
number of redundant workers within firms, known as ine-house unemployment. Various sources
estimate that the internalization of redundant workers now involves more than 1 to 1.5 million
regular workers, or 1.5 to 2.3 percent of the labor force ("Kigyonai shitsugyosha," 1993;
Stewart and Dowling, 1994; "Japan's jobless rate unmasked?," 1993). Sumitomo Research
("Kigyonai
Institute estimates its number as. high as 3 million (or 4.8 percent of the labor force)
.
shitsugyo," 1993). These figures suggest the severity of overcapacity in Japanese firms. 11

10

Although a common view states that Japanese shareholders receive low pr9fits and
meager dividends. Compared with shareholders in the -U.S., Abegglen and Stalk (1985) report
dividends are paid in Japan to "reassure shareholders thatthe company is healthy." Japanese
companies commonly pay dividends equal to about 10 percent of the par value of the stock, even
by borrowing money or selling assets .to assure this payment. ·Moreover, Abegglen and Stalk's
(1985: 169-174) analysis of stock price appreciation in the U.S. and Japan in sixteen out of
twenty-one industry leaders shows that Japanese· shareholders fared better than their U.S.
counterparts.
11

Anecdotal evidence suggests ·_ that -in-house unemployment involves social and
psychological humiliation. Americans might ask why these underemployed workers do not
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Japanese management is not driven by shareholder interests in dividends and appreciation
because they are embedded in economic,. political, and social relations that subsumes capital
interests. First, many of the large and medium sized firms in Japan are affiliated with one ·of•
several keiretsu. · These affiliations have several implications, but one is that most Japanese
company stock is not publicly traded, but is held by other affiliated companies. The ownership
of coti).pany shares is carried out through a network of known firms with durable relationships,
not anonymous securities markets. 12

Second, pro-employment government. policy is

implemented through employment subsidies to firms, funds to targeted industries, and
administrative guidance. 13 Third, the media in Japan constrains cpmpany policies because it
shapes, in large measure, the reputation of Japanese firms.

Keiretsu Affiliation

The historical roots of the Japanese model of corporate ownership date back to the 1950s
after SCAP (Supreme Commander of Allied Powers) purged the power of Zaibatsu by removing
collect retirement benefits and seek other jobs. Many in-house unemployed workers stay with
the company for three. reasons: First, leaving a company would risk economic security. There
is no guarantee of finding a new job. Second, employment institutions, built on the bases of inhouse training, make it difficult for middle aged and older workers to move from one company
to another. Worker's skills are often firm specific and not transfer.able to other companies.
Third, horizontal network systems among Japanese corporations (e.g~, keiretsu) make job
mobility between firms of comparable size and across different groupings difficult.
12

In addition, stock ownership is often reciprocal, blurring the distinction between owner
and owned. Finally, stock ownership loses meaning in Japan because it is only one of many
different types of relationships taking place simultaneously between any two affiliated firms (e.g.
purchases, sales, debts, directors, etc) (see Gerlach, 1992:225-227).
13

Chalmers Johnson (1982: 267) writes that during previous recessions MITI's ·
administrative guidance was implemented through industry "cooperative discussion groups."
These industrial cartels set production quotas; barriers to entry, market control and investment
strategies to stave off the consequences of recession.
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family control of major holding- companies (Dore, 1993; Aoki, 1987). Shares held by the

Zaibatsu families were liquidated and 40% of the total shares were sold. No one was allowed
to acquire more than 1 percent of any company and old managers of the Zaibatsu were replaced
with young technocratic managers. Further, top corporate executives were prohibited by law
from receiving stock options in their companies, a significant contrast to the American practice
(Abegglen and Stalk, 1985: 187). 14 The Antimonopoly Law of 1947 imposed a 5 percent
ceiling on bank holdings in the. stock of any single company, but subsequent legislation raised
this ceiling to 10 percent.
. Liberalized foreign investment along with the stock market crash of 1964-65, sent
- widespread fear of unfriendly takeovers by powerful foreign, especially American, companies
(Johnson, 1982). To insulate the management from outside takeovers, Japanese companies
bought each other's shares (primarily among keiretsu affiliated firms) so only about a quarter
of the total shares issued by a company were publicly traded. If any predatory corporate raider
came in and tried a takeover, no more than 20-25 percent of the firm's share.s were publicly
available for purchase. T. Boone Pickens' unsuccessful attempt to takeover Koito Manufacturing
in 1992 illustrates the effectiveness of this strategy. By the f980s, 66 percent of all corporate
stock in.Japan was owned by corporations (Kerbo, 1991: 436). 15

14

This legal- regulation partly explains the modest earnings of corporate executives, as the
income gap between the top executive class and the entry-level employee class was 7: 1 in Japan
compared to 37:Lin the U.S. in 1984 (Kerbo, 1991: -431).
15

Various authors have noted that family stock ownership in Japan is much lower than that
in the U.S. In the early 1980s, half of all corporate stock was controlled by families and
individuals in the U.S., whereas it was 27 perc;ent in Japan (Kerbo, 1991: 435).

-
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The key differences between the U.S. and Japan is that_ stock is privately traded and
owned by other corporations within the same keiretsu affiliation in Japan. In the U.S. it is
publicly traded and controlled by financial firms (pensions, investment houses, insurance, and
bank trusts) that are in reality owned by worker pension funds (Kerbo, 1991: 436). Aoki (1987:
280) suggests that "member-firms (keiretsu affiliated) of corporate groups are more risk averse
than independent firms and that grouping functions as a mutual insurance scheme." Mutual
sha,reholding, long-term relationships, interlocking directorates and president's club memberships
cement the bonds among firms and provide mutual monitoring mechanisms. 16 One important
result of the differences in corporate structure is that Japanese firms are not subjected to
pressures from pension managers,_ accountants and stock analysts for quarterly .financial gain.

Government Influence

There is a growing recognition that Western governments give money to workers after
they lose jobs, but in Japan the government pays distressed companies not to lay off workers.
In fact, the government has -taken a number of measures, inost notably, various subsidy
programs to employers. In 1974,-the government revised the Employment Insurance Law and
created the Employment Stabilization Services. It was the time when the first oil shock hit Japan
and caused the most severe recession in post-war history.
Employee contributions fund these services. The contributions are equal to 1.25 percent
-of worker's salary. ·The funds provide subsidies to companies in designated industries for a

16

Recent studies provide evid~nce that earnings of employees at member-firms of corporate
groups are on the average significantly lower than at independent ·firms, indicating the tradeoff
between earnings and job security (Gerlach, 1992).
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number of employment adjustment measures mentioned above (step a through h) and in Table
2. · Known as the Empioyment Adjustment Subsidy, it is a program created to secure
employment stability of workers and promote the smooth transformation from an industrial
structure that is depressed into other more promising industries. When a firm restructures
\

without resorting to the dismissal of regular workers, subsidies are paid either for temporary
release of workers from work, worker training, or temporary transfer to other firms (shukko).
For example, subsidies now pay three-fourths of the worker's wages to small or medium size
firms, and two-thirds of the wages to large firms for worker training. 17 Starting in 1994, the
Ministry of Labor further strengthened the existing employment adjustment measures (The Total
Plan for Employment Adjustment) •by relaxing a number of eligibility requirements for receipt ·
of subsidies as well as the duration of receipt (Ohashi, 1994). Under the new regulations, a
company can receive subsidies for up to three years, extended from the previous rule· of two
years. 18 In addition, the expanded programs support dispatching of workers aged 45 and older
by paying one-quarter of wages to large firms and one-third of wages to small or medium firms.
The total cost of these employment adjustment programs was about $747 million (86 billion yen)

17

What is considered small -or medium size depends on type_ of industry. In the
manufacturing sector, for example, business establishments with 300 workers or less qualify for
a small/medium firm designation. In sales, the cut-off point is 50 workers (for wholesale, it is
100) (see Ohashi, 1994: 32). In addition, the amount of subsidies were raised in April 1993 to
present levels. Previously, two-thirds of the worker's wages were paidto small or medium size
firms, and one-half of the wages were paid to large firms ("Koyou chosei joseikin," 1993). The
government raised the amount of subsidies because of the deterioration in the economy.
18

Of course, firms must apply every year for the continuing ·receipt of subsidies.
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in 1993 and is expected to rise to about $3.26 billion (326 billion yen) in i994 (Ohashi, 1994:
33).19

Two hundred specific industries were designated for the employment stabilization
services, compared with some 160 industries receiving government subsidies during the recession
of 1986 ("Koyou chosei, 11 1993; Pollack, 1993d).

The industries included automobile

manufacturing, computer software; and electronics industries. In September of 1993, subsidies
provided the wages of about 132,000 workers released from their jobs temporarily and 17,000
workers undergoing retraining. In our calculation, the number of workers receiving subsidies
in September 1993 corresponds to about 0.23 percent of the labor force. 20 Since the onset of
the recession, 4 million workers, which is equivalent to 6.3 percent of the labor force, received
the subsidies at one time or another ( 11 Daifukyo, 11 1994). It is reported that the projected budget
for 1994- ($3.26 billion) may support job security and job transfer for an additional 1 million
workers _(Ohashi, 1994).

19 Calculated-by authors of this paper based on 1$=115 yen for 1993 and 1$=100 yen for
1994.
20

To double check the figure, we obtained information on subsidies in, Gifu prefecture for the period beginning June 1992 to April 1993.- The informationwas given to the authors of this paper from the prefectural government officials in June, 1993. Gifu prefecture is c~ntrally
located (north of Nagoya and east of Kyoto) with_ a working population of about 1 million. The
number of workers who were temporarily laid off under the employment stabilization program
ranged from-the lowest of 544 in August 1992 to the highest of 2,900 in April 1993, with the
average of 1,426 persons per month, or 0~ 14 percent of the labor- force. On the average,
workers took 3.5 days off per month. The number of workers who participated in training
under the employment stabilization program ranged from the lowest of 418 in March 1993 to
the highest of 1,356 in I>ecei;nher 19-92, with_the average of 670 persons per month. On the
average, training took 1.4 days per worker. The combined average of 2,096 (1_,426 plus 670)
equals to about 0.2 percent of the total working population in Gifu prefecture, a figure that is
in agreement with the national statistics.
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.Media and Public Opinion
The media has a powerful effect on the employment policies of Japanese firms.

A

company's employment records and labor relations are vital to its reputation and ability to attract
qualified workers. Once a company breaks with employment routine, it cannot recruit first-class
workers for years to come.

Extensive reporting on employment ·records and company

performance serve as guides to job applicants. College· graduates consider job security and
company reputation as the two most important factors in selecting their prospective employers
(Economic Planning Agency, 1992). It is expected that companies honor job security of regular
employees in exchange for their loyalty to companies through good and bad times. In bad times,
company managers are expected to cut their own benefits and positions when cutting labor costs
of the general workers. Ideals, by definition, are not always realized, but as a- standard by
which to compare employment adjustment strategies.

In Japan, a person's primary social identity is closely tied to one's membership with groups.
Thus, joblessness poses a serious social distress. It has been said that Japanese life consists of
movement from "house" (ie) to "house." One's primary ·identification is his/her membership
in the house. (including a company) or houses. Without a house/company identification, others
_do not know what to make of that person,. how to relate to that person; and neither does
he/she. 21

The person without a hmise/company identification becomes a ronin, literally a

wandering person.

In Japanese language, another form of the word "house" (uchi) is the

A Japanese worker when introducing o~eself will always say, "I am !soda Corporation's
Yamada Akira" rather than "I am Akira Yamada from Isoda Corporation" as most Americans
would. The introduction is unconscious and ingrained from youth~ It is far more than a matter
of semantics.
21

~
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personal pronoun for "I" and "we."

House identity, once established, is almost never

jeopardized, and the betrayal of one's house is perhaps the worst offense within- Japanese
society. 22
Until very recently, no employee of a major company would think of moving to another
major company.

Indeed, "defectors" would be treated with suspicion· by any subsequent

employer, having proven they were not to be trusted. Consequently, Japan had no trade secret
law, at least until 1990. However, recently, as companies began quietly laying off regular
employees; workers began pllrsuing sequential employment; and pay began. to be linked to
performance.
Even so, corporate employment practices and public expectations built up over four
decades are difficult to change overnight. The recent cases of corporate restructuring caught
widespread publicity because they were taken by big players, symbolizing very fundamental
changes·in the Japanese labor relations and employment ~yste~s (Table 3). 23 Among 24 highprofile companies listed in Table _3, eleven (or 46 percent) announced the-elimination of more
than a thousand regular workers through a combination of measures· such as no hinng of new
workers, worker dispatching, voluntary retirement, and worker dismissal (JAL, Nissari, Sakura
Bank, Oki Electric, IBM Japan, Sanyo Electric, Hitachi, Nippon Steel, TDK, Sumitomo Metal,

22

The Japanese Penal Code, for example, prescribes a penalty of not less than three years'
imprisonment for murder, but murder of one's lineal ascendant carries a mandatory sentence of
life imprisonment or death (article 200). In contrast, Americans are more frightened by random
violence caused by unrelated persons, and penalties for these crimes tend to be more severe
(Reidel, 1993).
23

Data were compiled by one of the authors (Chikako Usui) froin several. sources during
1993. Information on company characteristics were also added. by the authors of this paper.
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NTT).

In two cases, hiring of new graduates, which had been completed, was canceled

(Northwest Airlines, Kodak Japan). Six (or 25%) targeted directly managerial ranks (Cosmo,
Sanyo, Itochu, Pioneer, TDK, Hitachi).
The media and the public responded with intense discussions, especially on the "fairness"
of dismissing long-time workers only by paying extra retirement benefits but without helping
them in finding a new job (e.g., "Kigyonai shitsugyo," 1993). The media called into question
the procedures some companies used in forcing people out. For example, companies were
harshly criticized for their "casual" handling of worker termination and job cancellation of new
graduates. Workers expressed a "special" kind of angµish for being suddenly forced out (see
for example, Okumura, 1993).24

The media also questioned the active use of voluntary

retirement in restructuring, by citing cases where worker's felt betrayed; morale went down; and
most qualified workers took volu!ltary retirement and left the company ("Kondokoso," 1993).
A perusal of Table 3 will -quickly suggest the scope of the issue. The companies are
large, but the numbers of employees effected by these employment adjustment strategies is
relatively small. However, the events must be understood in the context of contemporary Japan.
-These employment strategies are drastic to the Japanese, because they have not happened in postwar Japan.

The Japanese_ perceive these events as "unthinkable" or "disgraceful" _and even

"shameful" on the part of the companies. The Japanese do not view the termination of the

24

On January 9, 1993, the New York Times featured an article with the headline ''Shock
in a Land of Lifetime Jobs: 35 M~agers Dismissed in Japan" which read that "the unthinkable
has happened in Japan, and it has touched a nerve in the ranks of the nation's middle managers"
(Pollack,_ 1993a). It reported the degree of shock and public outrage described in daily
newspapers in Japan. In March 3, 1993 the New York Times again featured an article with the
headline "Layoffs and Factory Closing Shaking the Japanese Psyche" (Sanger, 1993).
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relationship between a company and "new hire, 11 much less a long standing employee in a casual
fashion. To the Japanese, termination of a new hire is like canceling a wedding at the altar.
Surprised by the intense public outcry and harsh media criticisms, many of the companies
listed in Table 3 overturned their decisions to dismiss workers later. Pioneer and TDK, for
example, were "taken aback by the publicity surrounding its decision" and canceled their plans
(Sanger, 1993). The magnitude of the restructuring, the media's reaction, arid the reversal of
active voluntary retirement/worker dismissal by large firms is indicative of the importance of
media pressure and Japanese firms' sensitivity to their public reputation.

Discussion

Despite the severity and duration of current economic recession, Japanese companies have
resorted to a combination of restructuring measures that are less disruptive organizationally and
socially. The examination of employment adjustment measures taken by corporations reveals
the institutional environment in which companies are embedded as existing as social actors
concerned with approval, social status, and political influence. Japanese firms are subjected to
less pressure for layoffs, given the distinctive governance structure embedded in a network of
keiretsu affiliations. In addition, the Japanese government has shown a propensity to work with
business firms to help relieve employment problems.

This strategy lessens disruptions by

offering money to companies for worker retaining, allocation of extra holidays, and temporary
business closure.

It may equally be said that one of the biggest obstacles to restructuring among Japanese
· companies is their inability to terminate regular workers (Schlesinger, 1993). Critics argue that
the difficulty of worker termination leads to a slow and ineffective restructuring of corporations
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(see for example, Okumura, 1993). Others criticize government subsidy programs as delaying
changes that are necessary for companies ("Kara yaburenu," 1994). These views, in part, may
be valid. Yet the social and psychological costs of massive worker dismissals may equally be
costly. Many corporate managers acknowledge the need to overhaul employment institutions
but they also caution the danger of short--sighted solutions.25
Much more needs to be studied about how employment and labor practices will change.
Currently, there is a growing view that large corporations are shifting from "lifetime
employment accompanied by promotion within" to a more specialized system where occupational
roles and shorter tenure are supported in a more flexible labor market. Honda, for example,
announced a drastic reform in its internal promotion of managers by fastening a career clock of
regular employees.

Under the new system, whether a worker will be promoted to top

managerial ranks can be ascertained as early as 37 years of age, rather 45 years of age under
the old system. Those who will not be promoted to top managerial positions in the future may
retire at that point for better careers elsewhere ("Sanjuu nanasai no,11 1994). Whether the labor
market becomes flexible enough for those· seeking mid-career changes remains to be seen.
However, Honda's and other recent corporate announcements indicate a dear departure from
. the concept of life-time employment that existed for four decades.
Rapid aging of the Japanese. work force will pose additional pressures on corporations
with life-time employment and seniority-based promotion systems. Since. the mid-1970s,. the

25

According to a survey conducted by a leading business organization, 41 percent of
executives think Japan 'must thoroughly revise the lifetime employment system.' They _contend
that the concept of life-time employment and seniority-based promotiops were critical in
achieving post-war economic growth but they became increasingly inefficient and obstacles to
corporate flexibility (Williams, 1994).
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government lobbied corporations to raise mandatory retirement age to at least 60 years, and
since 1986, to 65 years. 26 As in employment adjustment subsidies, the government has given
subsidies to companies to keep older workers employed (e.g., subsidies for re-training and
retirement preparation). In view of current increases in the number of companies offering
voluntary retirement options as early as age 45, the government's pro-employment policies
counter with business' responses of pro-retirement approaches. The issues of employment,
unemployment, and retirement are intricately related, and the relationship b.etween the corporate
world and the government may produce another peculiar Japanese response to economic and
aging problems.

26

As of ·1992, 77 percent of Japanese firms with 30 employees or more have raised the
retirement age to 60. Over 90 percent of the firms have_ adopted such a policy to be
implemented by 1997.

29
REFERENCES
A special news report on people and their jobs in offices, fields and factories. (1993·, March 2).
The Wall Street Journal.
Abegglen, James C., &_Stalk, George, Jr. (1985). Kaisha: The--Japanese corporation. New
York: Basic Books.
Aiken,_ Michael and Samuel Bacharach, "Culture and Organizational Structure and Process," in
Organizations Alike and Unlike, Cornelius Lammers and David Hickson (eds.), (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
Anonymous, (1992). "General Motors Finds its Best Salesmen Yet" Economist. Vol. 325, No.
7789: 79-80.
Aoki, Masahiko. (1987). The Japanese firm in transition. In Kozo Yamamura and Yasukichi
CA:
Yasuba (Eds.), The political economy of Japan (pp. 263-288). (Vohime 1). Stanford,
Stanford University Press.
'

Ballon, Robert. (1989). The subcontracting system: Challenge to foreign firms. Business Series,
Bulletin No. 127. Tokyo: Sophia University, SophiaUniversityinstituteofComparative Culture.
Brewer, Geoffrey. (1993). "Abort, retry, fail?" Sales and-Marketing Management. Vol. 145,
No. 12: 80-86. Chandler, Clay, Schlesinger, Jacob M.,_& Bussey, John. (1992, December 7). Gearing down:
Japan economy, built on rapid expansion, faces wrenching shift. The Wall Street-Journal._
Daifukyo, suguni keiki taisaku o (Government policies urgently needed in the current severe
recession). (1994). Economisuto, January 4, 22-27.
Donaldson, Lex. (1985). In Defense of -Organizational Theory: A Reply to the Critics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Dore, Ronald. (1993). Each and rest. Japan Update, 25: 4-5, 24.
Economic Planning Agency. (1992). Kokumin seikatsu hakusho (White paper on living
conditions of Japanese). Tokyo: Government Printing Office.
Genasci, Lisa (1994, July 7). The downside of downsizing. St.Louis Post-Dispatch. p. 5c.
Gerlach, MichaeLL. (1992). Alliance capitalism: The social organization of Japanese business.
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

30
Granovetter, Mark, & Swedberg, Richard. (1992). The sociology. of economic life. San
Francisco: Westview Press.
Hamilton, Gary and Nicole Biggart. (1988) "Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative
Analysis of Management and Organization in the Far East" American Journal of Sociology
(Supplement) Vol. 94: 52-94.
Hickson, David, C.R. !linings, C.J. McMillan, and J.P. Schwitter, "The Culture-Free Contest
of Organization Structure: A Tri-National Comparison," Sociology, 8 (January, 1974), pp. 5980.
Hickson, David, C.J. McMillan, K. Azumi, and D. Horvath. "Grounds for Comparative
Organization Theory: Quicksand or Hardcore", Organizations Alike and Unlike, Cornelius
Lammers and David Hickson (eds.), (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
Hitode busoku kigyou ni haken (Dispatching workers to compames suffering from · labor
shortage). (January 4, 1994) .. Nihon Keizai Shinbun.
Hofstede, Geert. "The Cultural Relativity of Organizational Practices an Theories": Journal of
International Business Studies (1983) Vol. 14, No; 2. 75-90. ·
Hofstede, Geert. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. London: McGraw-Hill
(1991).
Japan update. {1992). New York: Japan Business Information Center.
Japanese have more family time. (1993, December 27). The New York Times.
Japan's jobless rate climbs. (1993, June 30). The New York Times.
Japan's jobless rate unmasked. (1993, July 13). The New York Times.
Johnson, Chalmers. (1982). MITI and the Japanese miracle. Stanford, CA: Stanford-University
Press.
Kara yaburenu seisaku (Non-revolutionary government policies). (January 10, 1994). Nihon
Keizai Shinbun. p. 5.
Kerbo, Harold R. (1991). Social stratification and inequality. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc.
· Kigyonai shitsugyosha suikei 100 man nin ni (Internal over-capacity of companies rose to 1 ·
million workers). (1993, April 8). Asahi Shinburi.

31
Kigyonai shitsugyo 300 man nin no ukezara (How companies deal with 3 million redundant
workers). (1993). Shukan Diamond, November 20, 22-31.
Kondokoso Nippon wa Karappo ni naru (This recession will deindustrialize Japan). (1993).
Shukan Toyou Keizai, July 24, 10-13.
Koyou chosei joseikin (Employment- adjustment subsidies) (1993, May 10). Nihon Keizai
Shinhun.·
Kyuju-yonenno daisotsu shushoku sensen wa satani kibishii (Job market for 1994 female college_·
graduates is even tougher). (1994). Economisuto, January 25, 36-39.
Maurice, Marc,
Arndt Sorge, Malcolm Warner, "Societal Differences in Organizing
Manufacturing Units: A Comparison of France, West Germany, and · Great Britain," ·
Organizational Studies, 1 (1980) pp. 59-86.
Maurice, Marc, F. Sellier and J .J. Silvestre. The Social Bases of Industrial Power. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press (1991).
Ministry of Labor. (1992). White paper on labor. Tokyo: Government Printing Office.
_ _ . (1993). Rodo keizai doko chosa (A survey of the current economy). Tokyo: Government
Printing Office.
Mueller, Frank. "Societal Effect, Organizational Effectand Globalization". Organization Studies
(1994) Vol. 15, No. 3 407-427.
Nakane, Chie. (1970). Japanese Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Nikko yonen de 5,000 nin sakugen (JAL cuts 5,000 positions in four years). (January 18, 1994).
Nihon Keizai Shinbun .
. Endaka fukyo ji yori kencho (Things look better than what they were during Endaka recession).
(1992, September 14). Nippon Keizai Shinbun.
Koyo choseijokin (Employment adjustment subsidies). (1992, May 10). Nippon Keizai Shinbun.
Ohashi, Hiroshi. (1994). Seifu no koyo-taisaku ni ketsuraku shite irumono (What's missing in
government employment adjustinent policies). Economist, January 18, 30-33.
Okumura, Hiroshi. (1993). 'Dai kigyou byou' ga kaisha soshiki no chusui o mushibami hazimeta
(Large company disease is spreading to the central administration). Economisuto, March 30, 5659.

32
Pfeffer, Jeffrey. (1994). Competitive advantage through people. California Management Review
· 36(2), 9-28.
.
Pfeffer, Jeffrey, & Baron, James. (1988). Taking the workers back out: Recent trends in the structuring of employment. Research on Organizational Behavior, 10, 257-J03.
·
Pollack, Andrew~ (1993a, January 3). Japan's taste for the luxurious gives way to utility and
frugality. New York Times.
_ _ . (1993b, January 9). Shock in a land- of lifetime jobs: 35 managers dismissed in Japan ..
The New YorkTimes. ·
·
____ . 1993c, April 23). How Japan hews to tradition of lifetime jobs. The New York Times.
_ _ . (1993e, May 21). Jobless in Japan: A special kind of anguish. The ·New York Times.
_·__ . (1993f, October 2). Japanese starting to link pay to performance, not tenure. The New
York Times.
_ _ . (1993g, November 28). Japan finds ways to save tradition of lifetime jobs. The New
York Times.
Reidel, Marc. (1993). Stranger Violence. New York: Garland.
Rohlen, Thomas. (1988) Permanent employment policies in times of recession. In Daniel
Okimoto & Thomas Rohlen (Eds.), Inside the Japanese system (pp. 13~-144). Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press.
Sanger, David. (1993, March 3). Layoffs and factory closing shaking the Japanese psyche. The
New York ·Times.
Sanjuu nanasai no teinen (Retirement at age 37). (1994, January 7). Nihon Keizai Shinbun,
p. 1.
'

'

.Schlesinger, Jacob (1993, September 16). Japan begins to confront job insecurity; The Wall
Street Journal.
Shin Nihon Seitetsu, 50 sai o chu-shin ni tairyou shukko (Nippon Steel· relies on a massive
number of dispatching of its workers aged 50 and older). (1994). Shukan Toyo Keizai June 4,
18.
Shushin koyo no gensou (Life-time employment: An illusion?). (1992) .. Shukan Toyou Keizai,
April 24.

33
Sorge, Arndt. "The Cultural Context of Organizational Structure: Administrative Rationality,
Constraints, and Choice," in M. Warner (ed.), Organizational Choice and Constraint:
Approaches to the Sociology of Enterprise Behavior (Farnborough: Saxon House-Teakfield,
1977), pp. 1-56.
Sorge, Arndt and Marc Maurice, "The Societal Effect in Stiateg1.es and Competitiveness of
Machine Toof Manufacturers in ·France and West Germanyll..The International· Journal of
Human Resource Management, (1990) Vol. 1, No. 2 141-172.
Special Committee to the Minister of Labor. (1991). Part timer no jittai (Conditions of part-time
workers). Tokyo: Government Printing Office.
Stewart, Hayden, & Dowling, Peter .. (1994, April 4}. Japan's 'real' jobless rate could soon
exceed US level. The Christian Science Monitor, p. 6.
Seasick, Seiji. (1994). Restructuring: Hard times require resilience II Japan Update 30, 2-3.
Special Committee to the Minister of Labor, (1991).
Taylor, Alex. (1993). "GM gets a Tune-up" Fortune, Vol. 128, No. 14: 54-59.
Treece, James. (1992). "Jack Smith is Already on the Tear at GM". Business Week, No. 3265,
May 11:37.
Useem, Michael. (1993). Executive defense: Shareholder power and corporate reorganization.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Usui, Chikako. ,(1993)~ Do American models .of career attainment apply to Japanese? Paper
presented at the Midwest Japan Seminar, Purdue University, December 4.
Williams, Michael. (1994, January 24). Toyota creates work contracts challenging lifetime-job
system. The Wall Street Journal •.
Whitley, Richard. "Eastern Asian Enterprise Structures and·the Comparative Analysis of Forms
of Business Organization". Organization Studies (1990) Vol. 11, No. l: 1-28.
World Development Report 1991. (1991). New York: Oxford University Press.
Wrubel, Robert. (1992). "Collision Course" Financial World. Vol. 161, No. 11:20-21.
Zetlin, Minda. (1993). "Can IBM Soften the Blow?" Management Review. Vol. 82, No. 8:
25-29.

